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THE ALIENABILITY OF NON-POSSESSORY
INTERESTS*
PERCY BORDWELL**
Favorable as were the common law judges to alienability, there were
limits to such favor. The chose in action was not in general transferable
nor the condition, nor, when it came to be recognized, the contingent
remainder. Why the favor shown in the one case was withheld in the
other has been the matter of much speculation. The avoidance of chain-
perty and maintenance was long the accepted reason, but more funda-
mental reasons have been thought to have been discovered in notions
of analytical jurisprudence or in the primitiveness of the medieval
mind. Further the matter has been obscured by a confusion in termi-
nology. Chose in action, seisin and disseisin of chattels, property and
right of property have been terms of many and sometimes mystic mean-
ings. In this paper the attempt will be made to show the historic setting
and now generally accepted usage of chose in action, to indicate how
little the supposed principles of universal jurisprudence help to clear up
this particular bit of history, to argue that the medieval mind was not
so primitive as supposed, and finally to point out that chattels have been
thought of in terms of property rather than in terms of possession well
back into the Middle Ages and that in the fifteenth century at any rate
the generally accepted view was that such property was no more lost
by a loss of possession than it is with us today. If this attempt has been
successful the ground will have been cleared for taking up the alien-
ability or inalienability of non-possessory interests.
CHOSES IN AcTIoN
The tentative title chosen for this article had been "The Alienability
of Choses in Action" and a case could have been made out for the treat-
ment of non-possessory interests under that head. Ames treated the
non-alienability of choses in action in reverse under the head of "Dis-
seisin of Chattels".1 Modern usage, however, does not support the ap-
* This is the sixth of a series of articles. The first, The Common Law Scheme
of Estates, appeared in (1933) 18 IowA L. R-v. 425; the second, Equity and the
Law of Property, in (1934) 20 IowA L. REv. 1; the third, The Conversion of
the Use into a Legal Interest, in (1935) 21 IowA L. Rv. 1; the fourth, Interests
in Chattels, Real and Personal, in (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 119; the fifth, Alien-
ability and Perpetuities, in (1937) 22 IowA L. REv. 437, in (1937) 23 id. 1, in
(1938), 24 id. 1, in (1939) 24 id. 67, in (1939) 25 id. 1, in (1940) 25 id. 707. The
seventh and concluding article will take up The New York Revised Statutes and
their Influence in American Law.
** Professor of Law, State University of Iowa.
'The three lectures on The Disseisin of Chattels, The Nature of Ownership
and The Inalienability of Choses in Action in AMES's LECTURES oN LEGAL HISTORY
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plication of chose in action to a non-possessory interest in land,2 and
its exact relation to rights of action and to personal property has been
the subject of much controversy.8 As opposed to choses in possession,
it would off-hand seem, to include "specific chattels of which the owner
is out of possession"4 but Elphinstone thought that in his day 'chose
in action' was not commonly used with such a meaning5 while T.
Cyprian Williams "submitted that in modern law, at all events, the
owner of a corporeal chattel, which is in another person's possession
either through bailment or wrongful taking, has not a mere chose in
action; the thing is not merely in action to him." These eminent au-
thorities might have gone much further. Back in the fifteenth century
when chose in action had already made its appearance,7 it was not used
by Brian, C. J.8 to characterize the right of the dispossessed owner of
the chattel. Rather it was 'right of property' that he used. Had he and
others thought of such a right as a chose in action his argument would
have been much strengthened.9 Brian's statement has added signifi-
cance in that it was used by Ames as the text for his "Disseisin of
Chattels."' 0
The tendency to include non-possessory interests in either land or
chattels under the head of choses in action is believed not to have been
very deep nor very old. The phrase 'chose in action real', so much
emphasized by Sweet,"' seems never to have had any real currency
notwithstanding its occurrence in a book in such constant use as
(1913) published after the author's death appeared under the one head The Dis-
seisin of Chattels during his life. 3 SELECr EssAys IN ANGLo-AmEitCAN, LAW
(1909) 541, 3 HARV. L. REv. (1889-1890) 23, 313, 337.
"I have been unable to trace the process by which the term 'chose in action'
came to mean exclusively a chose in action personal. It was evidently in a state
of transition in the eighteenth century." Sweet, Choses it Action (1894) 10 L. Q.
REv. 303, 308.
' See Elphinstone, What is a Chose in Action? (1893) 9 L. Q. REV. 311; T.
Cyprian Williams, Is a Right of Action in Tort a Chose in Action? (1894) 10
L. Q. Rpv. 43; Sweet, Choses in Action, id. 303; Brodhurst, Is Copyright a Chose
in Actionf (1895) 11 L. Q. REV. 64; Williams, Property, Things it Action and
Copyright, id. 223; Sweet, Choses in Action, id. 238.
'Elphinstone, What is a Chose in Action? (1893) 9 L. Q. REy. 311, 313.
5 Ibid.
'Is Right of Action in Tort a Chose in Action? (1894) 10 L. Q. REv. 143, 152.
'Sweet says that the first case in which the phrase occurs was Y. B. 9 Hen.
VI (1431) 64. It also occurs in Y. B. 37 Hen. VI (1458) 13. Equivalent phrases
were even earlier. Choses in Action (1894) 10 L. Q. REv. 303, 304. Mr. Sweet's
main reliance, as that of many others, for the cases in the Year Book was Sir
Frederick Pollock's Note F in the Appendix to his Principles of Contract (10th
ed. 1936) 692.
'Y. B. 6 Hen. VII (1490) 9A.
' Eight years earlier, Brian had said that an annuity could not be granted over
in that it was a "personal chose" that would be barred by a release of all personal
actions. Y. B. 21 Edw. IV (1482) 84A.
"0 Op. cit. supra note 1, 3 SEL. Es. 555, 590, 3 HARv. L. Ray. 34, 346.
1 Op. cit. supra note 2, at 305-308; see also 7 HOLDSwoRm, H.E.L. (1926)
523-527.
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Brooke's Abridgement.12 In the case of land, the question of whether
one had an entry or a mere action was one of great importance long
antedating chose in action. The difference between the two did not cease
with the Middle Ages but was brought into even sharper relief from
the time of Elizabeth when ejectment became the common method of
trying titles to land, for a prerequisite of ejectment was right of entry.
Rights of entry and rights of action became exceedingly technical
terms 3 and not even for a time was their place seriously threatened by
chose in action. The common bond between entries and actions as to
land on the one hand and the chose in action on the other was their
non-assignability which, in 1541, was said to be even more stringent
in the former case than in the latter.1 4 There was a tendency to reverse
the historic process and to make things choses in action because they
were unassignable rather than making them unassignable because they
were choses in action.15 This seems to have been responsible for such
application as there was of chose in action to interests in land. The
outstanding example of such application seems to have been the case
just cited from Brooke's Abridgement.1 6 Not long afterwards, how-
ever, the non-grantability of an advowson during a vacancy was placed
in part at least on the ground that during the vacancy the right of
presentation was not really an advowson, one of the most important of
the incorporeal hereditaments, but a chose in action.17 Apparently the
judges were hard put to it to ground their decision.' 8 Sheppard's Touch-
"2 Chose in accion & chose in Suspence, pl. 14; BROOKE'S NEW CASES (March's
transl.) 34.1 See (1921) 34 HARV. L. REV. 616-617.
",Loc. cit. supra note 12.
15 See Sweet, op. cit. supra note 2, at 307, 7 HOLDSwORTH, H.E.L. (1926) 529,
and (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 722. A belated example of this is to be found in
the opinion of Lord Blackburn, Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 11 App. Cas. (1886)
426, 439 where he says: "The principal argument used by the counsel for the
respondent, and it seems to have prevailed with Cotton L. J. and Lindley L. J.,
was that 'choses in action', of which things in action is a translation, had a tech-
nical sense in our old law limited to the right to sue for a debt or damages. I
do not think that made out. There always was a difference between personal
property, such as to be capable of being stolen, taken and carried away, and so
to be the subject of larceny at common law, and to be capable of being seized
by the sheriff under a fi. fa., and other kinds of personal property." Here not
inalienability in general but inalienability on a sheriff's sale is made a test of
chose in actiop along with liability to theft. Freedom from sheriff's sale would
even make the interests of many bailors choses in action (see 14 HAI.sBuR's
LAWS OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1934) 60) which they never have been except in the
loosest use of the term (see Williams, op. cit. supra note 6, at 152-154). The case
of the bailment alone would condemn the use of chose in action to include any
non-possessory interest. The actual decision in Colonial Bank v. Whinney was
that a share of stock in an incorporated company is a chose in action, which
would seem to be sound whatever the reason given for it.
"e See notes 12, 14 supra. For a somewhat different abstract of the same case
see Baooi, ABR. PATENTES, p4. 98, BR. N. C. (March transl.) 34.
• Stephens v. Wall (1569) Dyer 283, pl. 19.See Sweet, op. cit. supra note 2, at 306 n. 3.
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stone, with more discrimination, said that in such a case the presenta-
tion was "in the nature of a thing in action"'1 and distinguished be-
tween "things in action", as a right or title of action that doth only
depend in action, and "things of that nature, as rights and titles of
entry to any real or personal thing."20 Jacob, whose law dictionary
first appeared in 1729, was not content with this, however, and stated
flatly that: "A person disseises me of land, or takes away my goods;
my right or title of entry into the lands, or action and suit for it, and
so for the goods, is a chose in action."m2 This is such authority as there
seems to have been for the application of chose in action to interests in
land and it is not very formidable. Jacob's definition was in addition
to what he had taken from Cowell22 by way of Blount.2 3 Neither of
them had given any such extension to chose in action. Nor did Termes
de la Ley which in other respects showed important differences.2 4 It
may be said with a good deal of positiveness that as to land the term
chose in action never took.
In the case of chattels as well as of land the dispossessed owner was
not confined to his action and at any rate after the strong arm of Ed-
ward I was removed probably enjoyed a very large measure of self-
help.25 His right did not lie merely in action, therefore, any more than
the right of the one who had an entry on land.20 The two cases are
assimilated in the quotations just given from Sheppard's Touchstone
and Jacob's Law Dictionary.27 With regard to land the use of chose in
action as we have seen soon disappeared. With regard to non-posses-
19 (Ed. 1651) 241.
20 Id. 231. 21 (Ed. 1762).
22 INTERPRER (ed. 1701), first published in 1607. See p. 283, infra.
LAw DlcvsoARay (ed. 1691), first published in 1670. See p. 283, infra.
2, (Ed. 1708). See p. 284, infra.
" Britton (ed. Nichols, at 116) lays down a very strict rule against forceful
recapture because (Edward I is supposed to say) "our will is that everyone
proceed rather by course of law than by force." This did not preclude a limited
right of recaption in case of fresh pursuit (id. 57) and leaves open the question
as to what was meant by force. A similar strictness was shown throughout the
thirteenth century with regard to reentries on land. But in the case of land the
right to enter was soon extended where the possessor was in by tort and not by
title (see Maitland, The Beatitudes of Seisin (1888) 2 L. Q. R-v. 287) and in
the time of Edward IV we find a somewhat similar distinction being made in the
case of the chattel. One might enter but not break into the house of the trespasser
to retake the chattel but not into the house of a bailee of the owner or possibly
of a bailee or vendee of one who 'had taken the chattel. (3 HoLnswonT', H.E.L.
(ed. 1927) 279). The parallel between entry and recaption is striking. (See also,
LiT. TENURES, §§496-498). There was more need of recaption than of reentry
because of the lack of actions for the specific recovery of chattels. It is probable
therefore that recaption went at least step by step with re-entry. The assumption
that the limited right of recaption indicated in Britton was the lair of the later
Middle Ages would accordingly seem unwarranted and yet such assumption lies
behind the thesis of absolute 'property' in the trespasser. (Ames, op. cit. supra
note 1, 3 Sr.L. Es. 548-9, 3 HARv. L. Ra-v. 28-29).
_2' See LiT. TsizURES, §§496-498. 27Supra.
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sory interests in specific chattels as stated by Elphinstone and Wil-
liams, 28 it is not now common, or perhaps even correct usage. But with
regard to such interests chose in action proved much tougher in the case
of chattels than in the case of land. In the case of chattels, there were
no such technical terms as entry and action which had the field to them-
selves before chose in action appeared. On the other hand chose in
possession came to be used in antithesis to chose in action and it was
hard to think of the dispossessed owner of a chattel as having a chose
in possession. If every interest in personal property had to be put in
one class or the other, and such an interest was denied to be a chose in
possession, it would follow that it must be a chose in action. Happily
this dilemma can now be avoided for chose in possession has gone out
of general use2 9 and chose in action has accomplished what would have
appeared its destiny from the first, the designation of an incorporeal
thing. 0
The incorporeality of the chose in action was formulated at an early
time by Cowell in his dictionary, 1 the first edition of which appeared in
1607, as follows: "Chose in Action, is a thing incorporeal, and only a
Right, as an Annuity, an Obligation of Debt, a Covenant, or Voucher
by Warranty, Bro. tit. Chose in Action." This definition was somewhat
enlarged by Blount32 and added to by Jacob~s in their law dictionaries.
The illustrations were taken from Brooke though the generalization was
probably Cowell's own.8 4 In emphasizing annuity, obligation of debt,
covenant and voucher by warranty, however, Cowell seems to have
caught the predominant note of the Year Books. A debt or duty seems
to have been typical chose in action and this confirms the now generally
received opinion that the explanation of the non-assignability of the
chose in action was that it was something akin to the obligatio of the
Roman Law, a personal relationship between the parties and so not
transferable.8 5 But obligatio was broader than contract. It included ob-
ligations arising out of tort.3 6 Here the obligation was the right of
See p. 280, supra.
" See SALmOND, JURISPRUDENCE (8th ed. 1930) 481. The disuse of choses in
possession may be credited to the Married Women's Property Acts for it was
used most commonly to designate such of the wife's personal property as went
to the husband on marriage at the common law. However, Choses in Possession
still survives as a division of personal property in the works of Williams and
of Goodeve on personal property.
"Salmond, op. cit. supra note 29, at 282-3 and see p. 285, infra.
a' See note 22, supra.
' See note 23, supra. "See note 21, supra.
'* Editorial note by Pollock (1895) 11 L. Q. REV. n. 5.
"This explanation goes back to 2 SPENCE, EQUITABLE JURISDICTION (Am. ed.
1850) 850. It has been accepted by Ames (op. cit. supra note, 1, 3 SEL. Es. 582 n. 5,
3 HAtv. L. REgv. 337); by Poaocx, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT (10th ed. 1936)
213 n. (n) ; and more recently by 7 HOLDswORTI, H.E.L. (ed. 1926) 520 n. 5.
"8 Holdsworth, ibid.
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action itself and although, as has been argued, chose in action never
came to take the place of 'actions' or 'right of action' in the case of
land37 it was used even to cover these by Brooke"8 though with greater
finality also to include personal and mixed actions, such as actions of
debt, damages and ravishment of ward. 9 And so Blount enlarged
Cowell's definition of chose in action to include "generally all causes of
suit for any debt, duty or wrong." Possibly Blount was influenced by
the definition of chose in action in Termes de la Ley, the first edition
of which under that name appeared in 1624.40 It said: "A thing in
action is, when a man hath cause, or may bring an action for some Duty
due to him; as an Action of Debt upon an Obligation, Annuity or Rent,
Action of Covenant, or Ward, Trespass of Goods Taken away, Beating
or such like." This, in substance, would seem equivalent to what was
added by Blount. But the definition did not stop here. It went on to
say: "and because they are things of which a Man is not possessed, but
for recovery of them is driven to his Action, they are called Things in
Action." According to this the 'chose' is not the right of action itself
or the debt or annuity or covenant on which the right of action is based
but the thing to be recovered. Blackstone gave great currency to this
idea.41 It has been thought to be more in accord with common law
tradition than Cowell's and Blount's definitions which are criticized as
smacking unduly of the Roman Law.42 But if one starts in with a debt
as the typical chose in action the definition of the latter as an incor-
poreal thing is much more natural than its identification with the fruits
of a recovery. And even such pronounced Germanists as Ames and
Pollock have treated the chose in action as akin to the obligatio.43
The view that by 'chose' is meant the fruits of recovery rather than
the intangible right of action or the debt enforceable only by action has
been supposed to fall in with the materialism which characterized so
much of medieval law. But that materialism lay not in excluding in-
corporeal rights but in visualizing them as things. Sir William Holds-
worth states that "mere rights of action were not touched by this real-
ism". 44 But "touched" would seem too strong a word. Debts owed to
the King seem to have been touched by it. They were visualized as
things. It was in connection with such debts that the phrase chose in
' See p. 281, supra. " See p. 281, supra.
"See ABR. Chose in accion & chose in Suspence, pl. 14 and the same case,
Patents p. 98, BRooxcE's N. C. (March transl.) 34. Brooke does not specify rav-
ishment of ward but merely 'ward' in pl. 14 and 'ward of the body' in pl. 98,
but both these expressions would seem to hark back to pl. 11 of the first title
where only 'ward' is mentioned but where the Year Book report of which pl. 11
is an abstract shows that the right of action was Ravishment of Ward. Y. B.
5 Edw. IV 8, pl. 22 (1465). " See note 24, mspra.
'12 Com. (ed. Hammond) 396-397; see also id. 389.
,Brodhurst, Is Copyright a Chose in Action? (1895) 11 L. Q. REV. 67-68.
,See note 35, supra. " 7 H.E.L. (ed. 1926) 518,
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action first gained currency.45 Rights of action belonging to the King
also seem to have been touched by this realism provided the amount to
be recovered was not too uncertain.48 From the case of the King the
phrase was carried over into private life but there the realism stopped.
Choses in action of the King might be transferred but not those of
private persons. Had the typical right of action illustrative of chose in
action been an action to recover a chattel such as replevin or detinue,
the argument that the 'chose' in mind was the thing to be recovered
rather than the right of action itself would have been more plausible.
But even in the Termes de la Ley the actions referred to are debt,
covenant, ward, "trespass of goods taken away, beating or such like".
Actions to recover a specific chattel are conspicuously lacking. Doubt-
less a shift from 'chose' as the cause of action to the thing to be re-
covered is an easy one and this shift was encouraged by the unfortunate
dichotomy of choses in possession and choses in action,47 but fortu-
nately that dichotomy is outmoded4" and chose in action as an incor-
poreal thing would seem to sum up what has been its essential charac-
teristic from the first.49 This in principle is embodied in the definition
of Channel, J. which Sir William Holdsworth states has generally been
accepted as correct :r0 "'Chose in action' is a known legal expression
used to describe all personal rights of property which can only be
claimed or enforced by action, and not by taking physical possession."'
Enough, perhaps, has been said to show that the problems of the assign-
ability of choses in action and of non-possessory interests are distinct.
Their confusion, it is believed, vitiated the whole of Ames' treatment.
Two THEORIES
A great law teacher 52 and an historical genius53 have advanced the-
ories as to the non-transferability of non-possessory rights which after
"'Eleven of the fourteen placita in Brooke's Abridgement, tit. Choses in accion
& choses in Suspence concern the King and most of them either involve debts
or contain some reference to a debt as the typical chose.
" Id. pl. 11.
'"In Colonial Bank v. Whinney, L. R. 30 Ch. D. (1885) 261, 285, Fry, L. 3.
said: "According to my view of that law, all personal things are either in pos-
session or in action. The law knows no tertium quid between the two."
"' See note 29, supra. Fry, L. J.'s dictum, quoted in the preceding note, would
seem to be responsible for such vogue as it has at present.
"Chose in action might well go the way of chose in possession for it is a
great extension from the debts and rights of action of the earlier law to the
vast field of intangible personal property, much of it of a substantially permanent
nature, of the present. To indicate this field chose in action is not a very suitable
title. But it has been too long and too well established to be likely to go the
way of chose in possession. 1'7 H.E.L. (ed. 1926) 515.
' Torkington v. Magee, [1902] 2 K. B. 427. 430.
"Ames, loc. cit. supra note 1.
" Maitland, The Mystery of Seisin (1886) 2 L. Q. REv. 481, 3 SE.L. Es. in
ANGLo-Am. HisTORY 591.
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all are theories and not to be identified with the history which they
attempt to explain. The one was a venture in analytical jurisprudence,
the other in historical philosophy.
Ames' theory is as follows:
"A derivative title is comnionly acquired from an owner by pur-
chase or descent. The title in such cases is said to pass by transfer.
For all practical purposes this is a just expression. But if the trans-
action be closely scrutinized, the physical res is the only thing trans-
ferred. The seller's right of possession, being a relation between him-
self and the res, is purely personal to him, and cannot, in the nature of
things, be transferred to another. The purchaser may and does acquire
a similar and coextensive right of possession, but not the same right
that the seller had. What really takes place is this: the seller transfers
the res and abandons or extinguishes his right of possession. The buy-
er's possession is thus unqualified by the existence of any right of
possession in another, and he, like the occupant, and for the same
reason, becomes absolute owner." 54
And again:
"A right of action in one person implies a corresponding duty in
another to perform an agreement or to make reparation for a tort. That
is to say, a chose in action always presupposes a personal relation
between two individuals. But a personal relation in the very nature of
things cannot be assigned. Even a relation between a person and a
physical thing in his possession, as already stated, cannot be trans-
ferred. The thing itself may be transferred, and, by consent of the
parties to such transfer, the relation between the transferror and the
thing may be destroyed and replaced by a new but similar relation
between the transferee and the res. But where one has a mere right
against another, there is nothing that is capable of transfer.". 5
The second quotation refers to choses in action. The first carries
over to the relation between a person and a physical thing the same
non-assignability that in the case of the chose in action was attributed to
the personal relation between two individuals. It does not make all
rights into personal relationships as the Hohfeldians did"0 but it reaches
the same result as far as assignability is concerned. It is believed that
it was this theory of the general non-assignability of all rights that
Ames was referring to when in concluding his article he said: "The
ancient doctrine of disseisin of land and chattels was not an accident
of English legal history, but a rule of universal law."'5 7 If, by "the
' Op. cit. supra note 1, 3 HARv. L. REv. 315, 3 SEL. Es. 564.
' Op. cit. iupra note 1, 3 HARv. L. REv. 339, 3 SE!. Es. 582.See p. 287, infra.
7 Op. cit. supra note 1, 3 HARv. L. REv. 345, 3 SEL. Es. 590. Ames uses almost
identical language in referring to "the rule which prohibits the assignment of
rights of action in general" (3 HAmv. L. Ran. 338-339, 3 SEL. Es. 582) and it
would seem that in the quotation in the text he is merely extending the principle
of universality to the nontransferability of rights in general.
[Vol. 19
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ancient doctrine of disseisin"5 8 he did mean the general non-assignability
of all rights then this statement is intelligible, whether one agrees with
it or not.
The Hohfeldian doctrine, that all rights consist of personal relation-
ships,59 is not very old. Hohfeld's outstanding critic, who as to this,
thoroughly agrees ,with Hohfeld,60 traces it back to the Swiss writer,
Roguin, in 1889.61 Ames' doctrine seems to have been his own but
derived, as he saw it, from the Year Books and especially Brian, C. J.'s
dictum that a right was not transferable.6 2 His statement that a right
was personal and that it was non-transferable was merely saying the
same thing in two ways. There was no logical process in this, nor any.
explanation, nor any enlightenment but merely blank assertion. Given
one's own premises one can prove anything. Nor would ii seem that
Brian, C. J.'s dictum was meant in any such large way as Ames took
it. By right, he would seem to have meant a mere right, one that was
unaccompanied by possession and not amounting to property or owner-
ship. Unlike Vavasor, J.63 and others6 4 he believed that a trespass
changed the property in the goods and it was the right of property
that he considered to remain in the trespassee that he considered in-
alienable. To take his statement more largely is to ignore the context.
That the trespassee had something he could transfer provided he still
had property or ownership seems to have been assumed throughout the
Year Books.
Not only would there seem to be no foundation in the early law
for extending Brian, C. J.'s dictum to rights accompanied by possession,
but it would seem that if any such doctrine of the general inalienability
of rights had existed the development of the law would have been very
different. The perdurability of the fee simple and the inherency of the
latter's alienability would have been most unlikely. If the generally
accepted doctrine that the inalienability of the chose in action was due
5 8 Jtist what Ames meant by "the ancient doctrine of disseisin" has been a
puzzle. It is incredible that he should have meant the ancient system of devest-
ments and discontinuances with which the name disseisin is often associated or the
related notion of an estate turned to a right.
"'Hohfeld himself brought this out in a somewhat negative way (see SoME
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNcElToNs (1923) 75). It was stated more explicitly
by Cook (id. 14) and Corbin (Legal Analysis and Termiiwlogy (1919) 29 YALE
L. J. 165). See KocouREK, JuRAL RELATION S (1927) 425 n. 21. The Hohfeldian
doctrine.was adopted by the Property Restatement of the American Law Institute,
§13, Comment a, but the definition of transfer (id. 13, (1)) which goes with it
would seem so artificial as to raise serious doubts not only as to the practical
utility but as to the scientific value of the whole doctrine.
'o Kocourek, id. at 425. 61 Id. at 425 n. 21.
' Y. B. 6 Hen. VII 9 pl. 4 (1490). See op. cit. supra note 1, 3 HARv. L. REv.
34, 346, 3 SE. Es. 555; 590. "' Y. B. 6 Hen. VII 8 pl. 4 (1490).8
'Y. B. 19 Hen. VI 65 pl. 5 (1440) per Newton, C. J.; Y. B. 2 Edw. IV 16
pl. 8 (1462) per Danby, C. J. See also (1916) 29 HAv. L. Ray. 385.
19411
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to its kinship to the obligatio be warranted, 5 then the alienability of the
fee would seem to have been influenced by its analogy to dominiu n.60
Whatever justification there may be analytically for lumping all rights
as inalienable, there can be very little historical justification. In the
alienability of the dominium, the non-alienability of the obligatio, the
alienability of possessory interests, the non-alienability of non-possessory
interests, there is something to unravel, and such a theory does not
help in that unraveling at all. Proceeding from it Professor Cook
argued, and very convincingly, that there is no substantial difference
between the assignability of choses in action and the transfer of other
rights.67 This was diametrically opposed68 to the position of Ames,
*who, far from freeing himself from the materialism of an earlier time,
would have made it universal by insisting on the importance of the
transfer of the physical thing. That importance did manifest itself in
the law of Littleton's time in a stress on the necessity and consequences
of livery of seisin in the transfer of the freehold but this stress was
quite contrary to the greater emphasis placed on the form of the gift
in Bracton's time and to the flexibility of the use in Littleton's own.
The ascription of universal importance to the transfer of the physical
thing is very puzzling to anyone at all familiar with the history of the
English law of property.69 The creative periods of that law would seem
to be marked by the attempts, at last successful, to escape from any
such formalism.
In taking the position that things could be transferred but not rights,
Ames was at variance with Maitland whose Seisin of Chattels 70 had
suggested Ames' Disseisin of Chattels 71 and whose Mystery of Seisin 72
had been the source from which Ames had drawn the materials
on which his "doctrine of disseisin of land" 73 had been based. Far
from regarding such a principle as universal, Maitland had regarded
it as primitive but one from which society had only slowly emancipated
itself.74 He said: "I may have here and there a reader who can remem-
ber to have experienced in his own person what I take to be the history
See p. 283, supra.
"See 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, H.E.L. (2d ed. 1923) 4.
The Alienability of Choses in Action (1916) 29 HAuv. L. Rzv. p. 16; (1917)
30 HAIv. L. R'w. 449. " See 29 id. at 817.
" Property was one of the few subjects in the law school curriculum that
Ames never taught. (See LEcTrEs owN LEGAL HISTORY (ed. 1913) 19.) In so far
as it concerns the law of property, Disseisin of Clwattels strikes one as the work
of a brilliant amateur. "' (1885) 1 L. Q. REv. 324.
71 See op. cit. supra note 1, 3 HARv. L. Rnv. 23, 3 SEL. Es. 541.
72 (1886) 2 L. Q. Rrv. 481, 3 SmI. Es. 591.
"' Op. cit. supra note 1, 3 HARv. L. REv. 25 n. 1, 3 SEL. ES. 543 n. 3. For the
specific rules that were the starting point of Ames' "doctrine of disseisin of land"
see id. 3 HARv. L. REv. 25-28, 3 SEr. Es. 543-548.
7 Op. cit. supra note 72, 2 L. Q. Rzv. 489, 3 SEL. Es. 602.
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of the race, who can remember how it flashed across him as a truth,
new though obvious, that the essence of a gift is a transfer of rights
* * * A very large part of the history of Real Property Law seems to
me the history of the process whereby Englishmen have thought them-
selves free of that materialism which is natural to us all."' 75
To prove that this materialism did not go "back to a merely hypo-
thetical age of darkness" '76 Maitland cited the treatment of incorporeal
hereditaments. These lay in grant and not in livery. They would there-
fore seem to have been opposed to Maitland's theory. In fact the doc-
trine that they operated innocently and not tortiously-in that they
were a transfer of the right and not of the possession-appears as early
as the time of Edward II.7 Notwithstanding this, Maitland considered
the treatment which these rights received in our oldest books as the
very stronghold of his doctrine.78 "They are transferable just because
they are regarded not as rights but as things, because one can become
not merely entitled to, but also seised and possessed of them, corporeally
seised and possessed." 79
Suggestive as this statement is, it is not to be taken too literally.
Incorporeal interests may have been regarded as things but, in the
Roman Law, at least, this did not necessarily mean that they were
regarded as corporeal things for the classification into corporeal things
and incorporeal things was well known.80 Secondly, to whatever extent
such incorporeal hereditaments as rents were treated as corporeal things
the seisin of the seigniory or of the reversion or of the remainder
throughout the historic phases of the common law seems to have been
treated as fundamentally different from the seisin of the freehold. The
validity of the fine and of the recovery, for example, depended upon
seisin of freehold.
Maitland's main argument was that the attornment which was neces-
sary to complete a grant was in effect a receipt by the grantee and that
a receipt signified that the thing granted was something corporeal.8'
Thus Littleton referred to "such things, whereof a man may have a
manuell occupation, possession or receipt. '82 Granted that there was
more of receipt in attornment than of the consent of the tenant'to the
75 Ibid. 10 2 id. at 490, 3 SEL. Es. at 602.
7 Y. B. 3 Edw. II 7 (1310) (Seld. Soc.) Note 1 by Maitland is: "In other
words a feoffment may have a tortious operation, a grant cannot"
" Op. cit. supra note 72, 2 L. Q. REv. 490, 3 Sri.. Es. 602.7D Ibid.8 0 BR-croN, ff. 10 b, 52 b-53 b; FLErA, LIB. III, c 15; 1 BRiToE (ed. Nichols)
213, 228-230. It would seem that Maitland (2 L. Q. REv. 495, 3 SEL. Es. 607)
unduly discounted the great stress laid by the thirteenth century writers on the
distinction between corporeal and incorporeal things.
Bi Op. cit. supra note 72, 2 L. Q. R-v. 481, 492, 3 SEL. Es. 605.82LiT. TENURES, §10; see also PoLLocic, A FIRST BooK op JURISPRUDENCE
(4th ed. 1918) 132.
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landlord's transfer, 83 yet its character as a receipt was not so obvious
as to show a conscious identification of reversions and remainders with
corporeal things. That the attornment of the tenant was analogous to
the receipt of the land by the feoffee or the entry on the land by the
one who took under an exchange would seem clear but that it was any-
thing more than an analogy would seem doubtful. For many reasons
livery of seisin had in the thirteenth century come to have an impor-
tance that one would not have anticipated8 4 though its importance did
not reach its peak for perhaps two centuries more.8 5 When it became
obvious that certain interests were not adapted to livery, the grant took
on an importance that the charter of feoffment did not have. But its
complete sufficiency for a transfer would have been a matter for sur-
prise. Mere agreement Was not sufficient. Some formal act correspond-
ing to the livery was necessary and this was found in the attornment.
The grant might entitle the grantee to the reversion or remainder but
he did not have it so that he could grant it over until there had been
an attornment 8 6 To the writer it would seem that the fact that grant
and attornment was necessary is rather evidence that the reversion and
the remainder and the like were not considered corporeal things and
that Maitland was merely making the best of a bad case. In the History
of the English Law his theory, it would seem, is stated much more
tentatively than in the earlier article.8 7
To make Maitland's theory hold, namely, that the medieval mind
was unable to conceive of the transfer of a right without the transfer
of a thing, it had to be true of chattels as well as of land. The key to
the land law was seisin. For three hundred years and more prior to
the appearance of Maitland's "The Seisin of Chattels" in 188588 seisin
had been identified with seisin of freehold and so was not predicable of
chattels even of chattels real. Maitland showed that this had not always
been so, that seised had formerly been used as equivalent to pos-
sessed and as such was as applicable to chattels as to land. This showed
that the idea of seisin was not feudal and lessened the gap between the
law of chattels and the law of land. But Maitland's discovery did not
turn out to be as revolutionary as at the time it seemed to be.89 The
very fact that it took a great legal historian like Maitland to discover
,See Maitland, supra note 72, 2 L. Q. REv. 490-492, 3 SEL. Es. 603-605.
"2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, H.E.L. (2d ed. 1923) 87-89.
Namely, in LIrIroN's TENURES. 11 BRAcToN, fol. 53.
"7 "At the same time there is a great deal in our law, especially in the law
relating to incorporeal things, which shows that Englishmen even of the thirteenth
century found much difficulty in conceiving a transfer of rights unembodied in
a transfer of things." 2 H.E.L. 89. "(1885) 1 L. Q. REV. 324.
" Its importance at the time is reflected in the decision of Cochrane v. Moore,
25 Q.B.D. (1890) 57, that delivery was necessary for the oral gift of a chattel
and especially in Fry, L. J.'s opinion and in Ames, Disseisin of Chattels (1890)
op. cit. supra note 1.
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that the term seised was once properly used of chattels is convincing
evidence of its relatively minor role in the law of the latter. To this
relatively minor role Pollock and Maitland ascribe the meagerness of
the medieval law of chattels.90 It is not surprising therefore that in the
fifteenth century the judges refer to the transfer of a chattel by deed
or grant without the 'delivery of the chattel itself without explanation
or any apparent consciousness of innovation or anomaly.91 The appar-
ent application by Bracton92 of the requirement of a delivery in the
case of a chattel as in the case of land had disappeared. Nor though the
chattel was at a distance and so not available for delivery was there any
insistence on the necessity of a deed to effect the gift. From all that
appears mere words would have been sufficient.93 Surely at this time
there was no incapacity to conceive of a transfer of a right without the
transfer of the thing.
An admitted weakness in Maitland's argument was the possibility
that in the case of the sale of a chattel the transfer without delivery
was even older than in the case of gift.94 Certainly Brian, C. J. stated
what looks like the modern rule in 147715 "namely, that the ownership
of movables can be transferred by mere agreement, by bargain and sale
without delivery." His brothers, Littleton and Choke, made no more
point of delivery than he did but in the case at hand insisted on the
payment of the purchase price. Such payment seems also to have been
sufficient for Glanvill 9 6 although he placed the risk of loss on the
possessor 97 Bracton agreed as to the risk of loss but accounted for it
on the ground that title did not change until there was a delivery. 98
For this he vouched the maxim of the Roman Law 'traditionibus et
ussucapionibus dominia rerum, non nudis pactis, transferuntur.'99 Pol-
002 H.E.L. 182.
"Y. B. 7 Edw. IV pl. 21 fol. 20 (1467); and see 7 Edw. IV pl. 14 fol. 29
(1468).
"Ff. 38 b, 41; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, H.E.L. (2d ed. 1923) 180, 180 n. 2.
"See Y. B. 2 Edw. IV pl. 14 fol. 29 (1462). In Cochrane v. Moore, 25
Q. B. D. (1890) 57, 69, 70, the assumption is made that these gifts were very
likely by deed but as Sir Frederick Pollock says: "It does not seem at all neces-
sary so to read them" (Gifts of Chattels Without Delivery (1890) 6 L. Q. Ray.
446, 448). He agreed with the result in Cochrane v. Moore but on reasoning
that greatly minimized the importance of delivery.
" Op. cit. supra note 72, 2 L. Q. Rv. 496 n. 1, 3 SEL. Es. 610 n. 1.
"Y. B. 17 Edw. IV, fol. 1, translated in BLACKRURNT oN SALE (3d ed. 1910)
286. Blackburn says of Brian's argument: "His judgment -might have been de-
livered yesterday, as it is precisely what the law now is after the lapse of three
centuries and a half" id. 288.
" BFALES ED. (Beames trans.) Bk. X, c. XIV, pp. 216-218. See Williston,
Delivery as a Requisite it the Sale of Chattel Property (1922) 35 HARV. L. REV.
797, 798.
0" Glanville (op. cit. supra note 96) 218.
"Fol. 62. That there is no necessary correspondence between the risk of loss
and the title, see Sergeant Manning's note to Bailey v. Culverwell, 2 Man. Ry.
(1828) 564, 566.
0" Cod. 2. 3. 20; see also Bracton, ff. 38 b, 41.
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lock and Maitland minimize the influence of this maxim100 but here it
seems to account for the departure from Glanvill, whom, in other re-
spects in his account of sales, Bracton followed very closely.' 01 It is
Glanvill's exposition of the law, however, that is reflected in the reports
of the fifteenth century 0 2 and in the Statute of Frauds 0 3 and we may
suspect that the English tradition is represented by his statement rather
than by the views expressed by the thirteenth century writers under the
influence of the Roman Law maxim. This is confirmed by what Mait-
land himself says: "It seems to me that the law of an earlier time
required a change of possession on the one side or the other, delivery
or part-delivery of the goods, payment or part-payment of the price. ' 10 4
This is requiring something more than mere agreement but is incon-
sistent with the theory that property in the thing could not be trans-
ferred except by a delivery of the thing.
Perhaps too much time has been spent on this historical hypothesis,
even though of a great master like Maitland. Without questioning its
suggestiveness or perhaps its importance in the more primitive stages of
the law, those stages would seem to have been passed before the appear-
ance of the historic common law. The importance of seisin and delivery
of seisin in the law of land was due to many contributing factors, not
the least of which was the insularity of the judges after the great con-
structive period of the thirteenth century was passed. In many respects
the land law took a course of its own and the reading of the technicali-
ties of seisin and disseisin or their terminology into the law of chattels
has not been happy.
'PROPERTY' IN THE THIEF, TRESPAssER, BAILEE
Turning now from analytical jurisprudence and historical philos-
ophy, we come to what has been termed an "episode in English legal
history", 0 5 the ascription of 'property' to the thief, the trespasser and,
in a somewhat different way, to the bailee. Insofar as this carried with
it a denial of 'property' to the one whom we would call the owner,
it vitally concerned the alienability of the latter's interest, for to deny
him property was to risk placing his interest in the category of a mere
right or of a chose in action with their disabilities as to alienability.
'Property' was something more substantial than these. 'Prperty'
was likely to be identified with the thing which was the subject of the
'property' and so to lend itself to the materialism which was so con-
spicuous in the medieval law. Once disassociate it from possession, the
1002 H.E.L. (2d ed. 1923) 89.
" 'Id. 207 n. 3. 10" See p. 291, supra.
10. St. 29 Ch. II c. 3, §17. See POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, 1o. cit. note 101.
10" Op. cit. supra note 72, 2 L. Q. REv. 496 n. 1, 3 SEx.. Es. 620 n. 1.
"'
3 Ames, op. cit. supra note 1, 3 -ARv. L. REv. 40, 3 SEL. Es. 561.
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case for the alienability of non-possessory interests was much strength-
ened.
Under the influence of the Roman Law, property or proprietas was
coupled by Bracton and the writers of the thirteenth century with
ownership or dominium in contrast with possession.10 6 This corre-
sponded roughly but only roughly with the indigenous distinction be-
tween right of property and possession, jus on the one hand and seisina
on the other. 07 Right of property was of the essence of the writs of
right which were called proprietary on that account in contrast to such
possessory writs as the assizes. In them one alleged a seisin as of right
so that the highest interest in land was thought of not as an abstract
ownership but as a lawful possession. Possession was not thought of
as something apart from ownership but as one of its constituent ele-
ments. In his Disseisin of Chattels,'08 Ames tried to show that this
conception was carried over to the law of chattels and that in the
medieval law at any rate possession was as constituent an element in
the ownership of chattels as in the ownership of land. For lack of
adequate remedies he would even have made possession the only owner-
ship that the law of chattels knew in the fourteenth century except pos-
sibly in the case of theft.10 9 Passing for the moment his thesis of
absolute ownership in the trespasser,"10 there remains the other question
as to whether the same conception of ownership as a conjunction of
right of property and possession as existed in the case of land also
existed in the case of chattels or whether the law of chattels and a con-
ception of ownership more like that of the Roman Law and such as
we have today wherein ownership and possession are fairly distinct.
That the doctrine of tortious freehold, applicable to land, had its
counterpart to a certain extent in the law of chattels, as urged by Ames,
cannot be denied. But that such application to chattels was ever very
important or had any far-reaching consequences in the subsequent law
may be denied with equal positiveness. A number of cases from the
reign of Edward III constitute Ames' authority for the fourteenth cen-
tury. They are all within a few years of each other. In 1335 Sharde-
lowe, J. said: "The timber of the house pulled down during the estate
of the disseisor is never said to be the chattel of the disseisee, for if
you pull down my house and carry off the timber and I'bring my writ
of trespass, the writ will say Quare prostravit dornum suam, meremium
mnde asportavit and not meremium sun"'1 It was on this principle
. 1082 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, H.E.L. (2d ed.) 2, 4, 33, 78; Maitland, (op.
cit. sitpra note 72) 2 L. Q. REv. 481, 3 SEL. Es. 592.1 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, H.E.L. (2d ed.) 33. 108 See note 1, supra.
100 Id. 3 HARv. L. REv. 316, 29, 3 SEL. Es. 565, 549.
110 See p. 299, infra.
"'I Y. B. 9 Edw. III, 2-4, (1916) 29 HARv. L. Rav. 381.
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that the taking of the timber was not larceny.1 1 2 In similar vein, in
1352, on a bill in trespass where the defendant was charged with carry-
ing away and killing the plaintiff's horse, objection was made that after
the taking the horse was the defendant's and could not be killed contra
pacem. But on a new bill more carefully worded the plaintiff recov-
ered."1 3 Similar language had been used in 1334 by Herle, C. J.114
where replevin had been brought against one, who had a franchise to
have the goods of felons, to recover sheep that had been stolen and
abandoned in the defendant's hundred. This was a bold attempt to use
replevin against the third hand. Herle, C. J.'s statement that "you shall
not have-the sheep again, for he gives a mesne: namely, the felon in
whom the property was", leaves one somewhat in doubt whether the
fact that the defendant was the third hand was not the real ground
for the decision rather than any change of property. The physical prop-
erty had been in the hands of the thief and possibly that is all he meant.
It is easy to slip from property as ownership to property the subject
matter of ownership, and it must have been even easier in those days
when 'ownership' had not yet come into use. At any rate Herle, C. J.
thought it would be "hard law" if the stolen goods should be considered
the thief's for the purpose of forfeiture.1 15 Replevin against the third
hand was another matter. Of more vital concern as to Ames' thesis on
alienability is a fourth case from 1358 of which all we have is an abstract
in Fitzherbert.116 "If the beasts of my villein are taken in name of
distress, I shall have a replevin, although I never seized them before,
for the property is in my villein, so that suing of this replevin is a claim
which vests the property in me. But it is otherwise if he who took the
beasts claimed the property.""17 Coke's commentary on this is: "* * *
because the villein had but a right.""n 8 Coke had in mind no doubt
Brian, C. J.'s distinction between property and right of property'" but
it is only by inference that this can be read into the quotation. Replevin
is denied the lord where the taking of the villein's property has been
under claim of property but it had not been so many years that a claim
of property would have defeated any action in replevin 120 and the re-
markable thing about the case is that replevin was allowed the lord in
the case of distress' 2' not that he was denied it in case of trespass. In
... See POLLOCK AND WRIGHT, PossEssIoN IN THE COMMON LAW (1888) 230.11 Y. B. 23 Ass. pl. 64, (1916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 381.
"'Y. B. 8 Edw. III 10-30, (1916) 29 HARV. L. REV. 379.
11129 HARV. L. REV. (1916) 380. "1 8FITz. ABR. REPLEVIN 43.11 Transl. Ames 3 HARv. L. REv. 37 n. 4, 3 SEL. Es. 559 n. 1.
'
1 8 Co. LIT. 145 b.
... See p. 298, infra. 12 See p. 295, infra.
1I This was remarkable for two reasons, first, in making the bringing of the
action equivalent to a seizure and, secondly, because the property was not in the
lord at the time of the taking. See 1 F.N.B. (ed. 1794) 69 F.
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fact it is highly probable that the remark as to claim of property was
Fitzherbert's own and not in the original text at all.1 2 2 But be this as
it may, if the analogy to disseisin had been followed in the case of
trespass, the lord would have had a right to seize the chattels in the
name of the villein although he had no right of action.123 Right of
entry was by no means so personal as right of action.
To sum up these cases, 'property' in the thief or trespasser had
some slight vogue in the reign of Edward III. This would seem to have
been due partly to justify the taking of stolen goods by the king, 24
partly because of the use of 'property' to indicate the thing owned as
well as ownership itself,125 partly because seisin or possession had no
such vogue in the case of chattels as it'had in the case of land 126 and
partly on analogy to the tortious freehold.1 27 The thief or trespasser
had the chattel just as the disseisor had the land. In a certain sense it
was 'his'. It would seem, however, that this was a nicety of pleading
rather than anything much more substantial. The one case 28 having
any bearing on the alienability of non-possessory interests is not in the
Year Books themselves and its abstract by Fitzherbert reflects the
thought of the following century.
What appears to have been the destined use of 'property' as to
chattels from the first came not through disseisin but through the action
of replevin and the writ de proprietate probanda which came to supple-
ment it. Replevin as Herle, C. J. said was the most "possessional thing"
there was.1 29 As a preliminary to the action the possession was restored
to the plaintiff. Fundamentally it had far more in common with the
assize of novel disseisin than had trespass which was merely for dam-
ages. The most common example given by Maitland of seisin of chattels
was the plea of 'still seised' in replevin.130 Its summary process was
as unsuitable for the trial of title as was the assize and at first, as in the
case of the assize, pleas of title in the defendant were strictly ex-
cluded.13 1 In both cases, however, it proved hard to stick to the rigorous
logic of a summary proceeding and in replevin pleas of property in the
122 See 29 H.Av. L. REV. 379 n. 28, 393.122 Co. LIT. 118 b.
124 See 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, H.E.L. (2d ed.) 165-6.
... See p. 292, supra.
... While the tendency was to talk of land in terms of seisin or possession,
the tendency was to talk of chattels in terms of property. So pronounced was
this at times that Sir Frederick Pollock says: "Possession largely usurped not
only the substance but the name of Property." POLLOCK & WRIGHT (op. cit. supra
note 112) 5.
127 See p. 293, supra. 128 See p. 294, supra.
Y22 . B. 3 and 4 Edw. III (1310) Sel. Soc. 72.
'"Seish of Chattels, (1885) 1 L. Q. REv. 324i 325; (1916) 29 HARV. L. RIv.
391.
"I AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 66, 69, 182 n. 3.
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defendant came to be allowed after the case had gotten into court." 2
In the beginning a plea of property before the sheriff would have
stopped him and have prevented the case from coming into court. 83
The perils of trespass or even more of a criminal appeal in the case
of a false claim had perhaps under the strong rule of Edward I been
adequate to keep down false claims but apparently this did not continue
to be the case and soon the writ de proprietate probanda was provided
which allowed the question of title to be determined on inquest before
the sheriff on which, if the property were found in the plaintiff, the
replevin proceeded, if in the defendant, the property was returned to
him and the replevin was at an end.13 4 Such currency as 'property'
had prior to the fifteenth century is attributed by Pollock and Maitland
to its use in this writ.18 5 Here there was no plea of right but a plea
of property or ownership and so property or ownership came to take
the place in the law of chattels occupied by right of property in the
law of land. And it was to fill a great void, for seisin and possession in
the case of chattels had proved unfertile.
During the fifteenth century the use of 'property' became more
general. Once replevin had become an action in which the title to the
property could be tried there was no procedural difficulty in the way of
allowing it in case of trespass.3 0 There was not perhaps the same call
for trespass in case of a wrongful distress but trespass was a popular
action and so it came to be allowed in such a case. 1' This concurrence
of replevin and trespass was laid down by Bereford, C. J. as early as
1312138 but there was some doubt as to this' and- it is not until the
early part of the fifteenth century that we get a clear cut statement
from Gascoigne, C. J., that replevin and trespass were alternative reme-
dies in case of a trespass contra pacen.140 In 1440 Newton, C. J.
asserted that one whose grain had been taken from him could still call
the goods his own. He said:
"If you had taken my chattels it is at my wish to sue a replevin,
which proves that the property is in me, or to sue a writ of trespass,
which proves that the property is his who took them and so it is at
my wish to waive the property or not. So here, he has not waived the
property for he has justified for damage feasant in the said grain.' 4'
Y. B. 5 Edw. III (1331) 3-11, transl. AMES, id. 66 n. 5.
,s- Id.' 67, 182. 184 Ibid.
1112 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, H.E.L. (2d ed.) 153 n. 1.
"I AmEs, LEcrtRs ox LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 69, 183.
21' HoLDswoRTH, H.E.L. (ed. 1927) 285.
... Y. B. 6 Edw. II (1312-3) Sel. Soc. 143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150; 3 HOLs-
WORTH, H.E.L. (ed. 1927) 285. 13' Ibid.
"' Y. B. 7 Hen. IV (1405) 28B; AmfEs, LEcTaRs ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913)
69.-There were some who did not agree with Gascoigne. Ibid.
"" Y. B. 19 Hen. VI 65-5.
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From that time to this it has been a commonplace of the law that tres-
pass affirms property in the defendant, replevin in the plaintiff.142 With
replevin were classed detinue 43 and the appeals. 44 The matter was one
of election of remedies and no longer to be determined on the analogy
to disseisin as in the case of the preceding century where the bill in
trespass for carrying off and killing the plaintiff's horse had been con-
demned for repugnancy.145 The procedural character of the change of
property by a trespass was brought out still more strongly by Vavasor,
J. in 1490140 when he invoked the doctrine of disseisin at election, then
conspicuous in connection with rents. Another commonplace of the
law has been that disseisin at election unlike disseisin was remedial and
not substantive. 47 It would seem clear that to these judges property
meant ownership as it had in the writ de proprietate probanda, and as
it does to us today.
14 8
To the doctrine that the change of property by a trespass was purely
remedial there was distinguished dissent. The case involving the villein
in the fourteenth century149 had assumed that as long as the villein had
the property, as undoubtedly he did in the case of distress, he had
something that the lord could seize or, in other words, that was trans-
missible. If now property remained at his will in the trespassee, he had
something he could transfer' 5 0 and Danby, C. J.,151 Needham, J.152 and
Vavasor, J.153 expressed themselves accordingly. The stock case was
that of a taking from a bailee and a gift or sale to the trespasser by the
bailor. Danby, C. J. was of the opinion that the sale or gift was good
whether made before or after the taking. Littleton, as counsel, in sup-
port of his pleading, argued that the subsequent gift would be void
because the property would be in the trespasser by the taking and so
could not be given to him. In this he was opposed by both Danby and
Needham. In the later case, Keble, of counsel, argued for the validity
of the gift on the ground (1) that property was not changed by the
taking and (2) that if it were, an oral release of the chattel was suffi-
cient. Vavasor, J. denied the validity of an oral release even in case
142 See the opinion of Holmes, J. in Miller v. Hyde, 161 Mass. 472 (1894).
142Y. B. 6 Hen. VII (1490) 8 B per Vavasor, J.144Y. B. 4 Hen. VII (1489) 5-1; Bw.,LE CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed.)
820.
"' See p. 294, supra; see also Ames, op. cit. supra note 1, 3 HARv. L. REv.
32, 3 SEL. Es. 553. 'Y. B. 6 Hen. VII (1490) 8 B.
"
7LIT. TENURE-s, §589; 3 GRAY, CASES ON PROPERTY (2d ed.) 34 n. 1.
14:An early use of 'owner' is made in this connection by Keble, of counsel,
in his argument with Brian, C. J. He said: "The true owner has the property
and not the wrongdoer, as I understand" Y. B. 10, Hen. VII (1495) 27-13.
140 See p. 294, mtfra.
1 Littleton states this as clear law in the case of disseisin by election. See
TENURES, §589. 15 Y. B. 2 Edw. IV (1462) 16-8.52 Ibid. 1.. Y. B. 6 Hen. VII (1490) 8 B.
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of a chattel but supported the gift on the first ground. In his support
of the gift, Vavasor was opposed by Brian, C. J. on the same reasoning
used by Littleton as counsel so many years before. Brian said: "In my
opinion the property is devested by the taking, and then he had only
a right of property; and sq the property and right of property are not
all one. Then, if he has only a right, this gift is void; for one cannot
give his right."'154 And again five years later: "The gift is void to him
who had the goods as much as it would be to a stranger, and I think
a gift to a stranger is void in such a case." 155
The "In my opinion" and "I think" of Brian, C. J. was for a man
of his authority and positiveness to confess that the matter was con-
troversial and that he did not purport to state accepted law. The law
of chattels he would have adapted to the law of land, made property
correspond to the tortious freehold and right of property to right of
entry and right of action. It is clear that the law might easily enough
have taken this turn. Had the law of estates applied to chattels no doubt
it would have done so. But the law of estates had not been applied to
chattels and this made any application to chattels of the notion of an
estate turned to a right anomalous. Some substitute for the law of
estates was necessary in the case of chattels and this had already come
to be found in the notion of property or ownership disassociated from
possession. This has been the tradition of the English law and despite
the discovery that at one time the word 'seised' was used of chattels,
it is believed that it is a sound tradition. For better or for worse the
law of chattels took a different turn.
That Brian, C. J.'s opinion was contrary to the trend the common
law had taken does not mean it was without some effect. He was a
great judge and his words had-authority. It was in just such pithy
sentences as his that the abridgement makers reveled. Brooke, .in par-
ticular, out-Brianed Brian for whereas the latter, in an action by one
whose horse had been taken against the second trespasser, denied re-
covery, this was not on the ground of a change of property by the first
trespass but of a' change of possession,'5" while it was left to Brooke
to add the comment: "For the first offender has gained the property by
,the tort."' 57
The opinion that Brian expressed of the invalidity of a gift to a
stranger of property taken by a trespasser probably had more effect
than his more general analysis. This was reaffirmed in Sheppard's
Touchstone but a gift to the trespasser was approved on the ground that
"I Ibid. (transl. Ames), 3 HARv. L. REv. 34, 3 SEL. Es. 555.
65Y. B. 10 Hen. VII (1495) 27-13 (transl. Ames), 3 HAIv. L. Rsv. 35, 3
SEL. Es. 555.16-Y. B. 21 Edw. IV (1482) 74-6, (transl. Ames), 3 HARv. L. REv. 29, 3 SEL.
Es. 549. 1" AR. TR~sp. 358.
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"I may give the goods to the trespasser, because the property of them
is still in me."' 5 8 Neither the gift to the stranger nor the gift to the
trespasser seems ever to have been much more than a moot case and if
we may judgeofrom Ames' 59 and Holdsworth,160 there has been little
authority on the matter in England since the time of the Touchstone.'"'
Had it come up, there is little likelihood that the courts would have
based their decision on a loss of property by a trespass any more than
the Touchstone did. Like the Touchstone they might have denied the
validity of the gift to the stranger on analogy to disseisin or even gone
further than the Touchstone did and called the right of the dispossessed
owner a chose in action. That the latter has not been approved usage in
England for a very considerable time at any rate has already been
shown. 1 2 There has been some authority to support it in the United
States' 63 but there has been little excuse for this since the early dictum
of Mr. justice Story that "the sale is not, under such circumstances, the
sale of a right of action, but is the sale of the thing itself."'16 4 Dean
Ames criticized this' 65 yet not only modem usage but history as well
would seem to be more in accord with the views of his great prede-
cessor.
Not content with property in the trespasser and right of property
in the one from whom the property had been taken, Dean Ames would
have it that at one time in the fourteenth century, 66 before replevin
became theoretically concurrent with trespass, the trespasser "gained
by his tort both the possession and the right of possession; in a word,
the absolute property in the chattel taken."'087 This was riding a
hobby. 168 Certainly no intimation of any such theory appears anywhere
1.8 SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE (ed. 1651) 240, 241.
15" Op. cit. supra note 1, 3 HARV. L. REV. 35, 3 SEL. Es. 556.
10 7 H.E.L. (ed. 1926) 456. In his quotation of Preston's comment on the
passage in the ToucHsToNE Sir William Holdsworth shows the influence of Ames
as he does throughout his entire treatment of the law of chattels in the Middle
Ages. Not unmindful of this, the writer is as much as ever of the opinion that
The Disseisin of Chattels gives a very distorted idea of that law.
1"1 First published in 1641.
182 See pp. 279-285, supra. The confusion in vocabulary as to chattels, of which
Pollock and Maitland complain (2 H.E.L. (2d ed.) 168), would not seem to
have been so much medieval as of a somewhat later date, nor so much the con-
sequence of the application of disseisin to chattels in the fourteenth century or
of the distinction betwebn property and right of pr6perty made by Brian, C. J.
as of the more modern indiscriminate use of chose in action in contrast with
chose in possession. Ames' entire thesis is vitiated by his identification of Brian's
right of property with the chose in action.
See Ames, op. cit. supra note 1, 3 HARV. L. RE . 35, 3 SEL. Es. 556.
184 Brig Sarah Ann, 2 Sumner 206, 211 (1835).
18Op. cit. supra note 1, 3 HARv. L. REV. 344, 3 Sat.. Es. 588.
18Op. cit., in note 1, 3 HAMW. L. REV. 316, 29, 3 SEL. Es. 565, 549.1 Id. 3 HARV. L. REv. 29, 3 SEL. Es. 549.
188 It is a conspicuous example of what is said in his Memoir (LEcruas ON
LEGAl, HISTORY (1913) 17): "Once satisfied that a certain principle was sound
... his enthusiasm would lead him to believe that judges had acted on the prin-
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in the sources. Rather it is a deduction from our very inadequate
knowledge of the remedies of the time as to chattels.169 Furthermore
it assumes that specific recovery is essential to a right in rem, an as-
sumption the unsoundness of which has been demonstrated by Cook7 0
and Hohfeld.171 A very persistent conception of ownership may be
realized through an action for damages. But taking Ames' own case,
he limits it to the time before the institution of the writ de proprietate
probanda172 and that seems to go back further than he thought," 3 back
of the reign of Edward III and into that of Edward II. If so, it was
already an existing institution when the early instances of ascription
of property to the trespasser and thief, which he cites, occurred." 4
And in the case of the thief there had always been the specific recovery
of the appeals. Therefore it does not look as if the fact that trespass was
an action for damages was responsible for the early examples that we
have of the ascription of property to the trespasser.175 Nor in the rela-
tively short time trespass had been in existence prior to the writ de
proprietate probanda loes it seem likely that it had effected any funda-
mental changes in notions of property. It was a very effective remedy
just as was the assize but no more than the latter would it seem to have
affected notions of proprietary right. That relief in the King's court
as to chattels was very limited may be admitted without impugning
the persistency of title which seems characteristic of pioneer conditions.
Cattle-lifting was just as outstanding an offense in the early Germanic
law as horse-stealing in the pioneer West. That the success of an action
ciple in deciding certain cases where (in all probability) the judges had been
profoundly unconscious of any such principle."
""The whole theory of absolute property falls if there was any such exten-
sive right of self-help as there was in the later law. But whatever may have
been true of the right of recaption in Edward I's time, there is every probability
that thereafter the extension of recaption went at least step by step with the ex-
tension of re-entry. See note 25, supra. In a letter to Ames dated March 23, 1890(2 CAMs. L. J. (1924) 16) Maitland recognized the possibility of the gradual
enlargement of the sphere of self-help and said he should like to be able to trace
its different stages but apparently never did so.
"" Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) 15 CoL. L. REy. 43.
Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 710, 754; reprinted
in book of same name (1923) 103.17 Op. cit. supra note 1, 3 HARv. L. REv. 32, 2 Srz. Es. 553.1 In his LacTUREs, 68, Ames says tfiat the earliest allusion he had found to
the writ was in 30 Edw. III (1355) and discounted the reference to it in FIrz.
AE'. Proprietate probanda 4 as of 2 Edw. III (1327) as a misprint but there is a
reference to the writ in Firz. ABR. REPLEvIN 26 as of 19 Edw. 11 (1326) and Sir
William Holdsworth is inclined to put it back as far as 1313-1314. See 3 H.E.L.
(1927) 284 n. 7.
.. See pp. 293-294, supra.
"I That trespass was an action for damages seems to have had little or noth-
ing to do with the application of disseisin to chattels in the fourteenth century but
a great deal to do with the application of disseisin at election to chattels in the
fifteenth (see p. 296, supra) ; but the latter was procedural and not substantive.
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for damages should have submerged this idea of the persistency of title
even for a time is extremely unlikely.176
'Property' in the thief may be dismissed with a word. Property
had too much of ownership in it to make its ascription to the thief seem
natural. The case given by Ames 177 remained an isolated example.
The bringing of an appeal of larceny or robbery affirmed property in
the one from whom it had been stolen whereas the bringing of trespass
waived the property and affirmed it in the defendant. 7 8 Thus the ap-
peals like replevin and detinue were contrasted with trespass and- it
was said that in this sense trespass altered the property but otherwise
was it of theft. That a theft did not change the property in the goods
was the accepted law of the Year Books.'7 9
Whatever might be said of the trespasser or thief, the bailee was no
disseisor. He held under the bailor and not in opposition to him. His
possession was loyal or permissive and not adverse. Brian, C. J. did
not ascribe property to him and right of property to the bailor. As a
matter of fact he ascribed property to the bailor even where he had
no present right to the possession. 80 Nor did Ames call the bailee a
tlisseisee. But, going Brian one better, he did deny that the landlord,
bailor, loser, as well as the disseisee could properly be called a true
owner.1 8' To a great extent this was a matter of words. But .Ames did
not treat it as such. He identified Brian's right of property with the
chose in action, as he did the right of the landlord, the remainderman
and the bailor and so brought all under one head. 8 2 Nothing could be
more unhistorical as to the reversion and remainder, 88 and Pollock and
Maitland have pretty well demonstrated that it could never have been
true of the interest of the bailor.'8 4 Chose in action has been somewhat
"" In a letter to Maitland of Nov. 27, 1889 (2 CAmD. L. J. (1924) 12) Ames
summarized his case as follows: "This criminal proceeding [the appeal] was for
a long time the only mode of recovering a lost or stolen chattel. In England it
continued the only remedy until the action of Detinue was allowed against a
finder, and it would seem that long before that the appeal had practically been
superseded by trespass. Hence the doctrine that a disseisor of a chattel got an
absolute title." With all deference it does not make much of a case.17' See p. 294, supra. '" See p. 297, supra.
"" STAUNF. PL. Co. 61 a, 188 a; Firz. ABR. CoR. 39; BRo. ABR. COR. 171;
FiNcH, LAW, 210; VINER, ABR. PROPERTY (E 4) ; Com. DIG. BiENs (E) ; (1916)
29 HARv. L. REv. 381.
Y. B. 17 Edw. IV (1477) 2 A, transl. BLACKBURN, SALE (3 Can. ed. 1910)
286.
'Op. cit. supra note 1, 3 HAav. L. REv. 314, 3 SEL. Es. 562-563.182 Id. 3 HARv. L. REV. 338, 3 SEL. Es. 581.
... Evidently what Ames meant was that the grant of a reversion or remainder
was not complete without attornment. This meant to him that reversions and
remainders were in general inalienable and choses in action. But to classify
reversions and remainders during the Middle Ages as choses in action is a re-
ductio ad absurdum of his whole theory. However one cannot help admiring the
courage of his logic. 18'2 H.E.L. (2d ed.) 176-178.
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of a loose term but nowhere else, it is believed, has that looseness been
carried so far.
There was a certain property recognized in the bailee. He could
call the goods 'his' to satisfy the requirements of trespass. But this
was a special property and not inconsistent with the general property in
the bailor.1s5
To sum up a long story, 'property' at an early time came to be as
cardinal in the case of chattels as seisin in the case of land. The differ-
ence was more than one of mere words. 'Property' was not merely
possession as of right, but might exist independently of possession. Loss
of possession by bailment or losing or trespass or theft, therefore, did
not displace 'property' in its general acceptation, although in the case
of trespass the words to the contrary of a great judge, Brian, C. J.
lingered long in the books and were taken up by Dean Ames in our own
day. They led to a confusion in vocabulary but apparently not to very
much more. That such loss of possession would convert 'property'
into a chose in action was a later development, modern rather than
medieval, and resulted largely from the unfortunate dichotomy of per-
sonal property into choses in action and choses in possession. Fortu-
nately that dichotomy is outmoded although chose in action continues
to hold its ground despite its unsatisfactoriness. But the notion that
loss of pbssession would convert 'property' into a chose in action has
had even less place in the law than Brian, C. J.'s right of property. Its
importance has been terminological rather than substantial. Unless these
difficulties of vocabulary are kept in mind, however, the matter of the
alienability of non-possessory interests, especially in chattels, is much
obscured.
No tendency has been observed, except in the case of Ames him-
self, to apply his theory of ownership to our own day. It has often
been assumed, however, that it gave a true picture of the medieval law.
Thus Mr. Justice Holmes in Miller v. Hyde said:
". .. a tortious possession, at least if not felonious, carried with it
a title by wrong in the case of chattels as well as in the case of a dis-
seisin of land, as appears from the page of Viner just cited, and as has
been shown more fully by the learned researches of Mr. Ames and Mr.
Maitland, 3 Harv. Law Rev. 23, 326. See 1 Law Quarterly Rev. 324.
I do not regard that as a necessary doctrine, or as the law of Massachu-
setts, but it was the common law, and it fixed the relations of trespass
and replevin to each other. . ... 186
Professor Williston, however, was more guarded. He said:
cc.. To what extent Mr. Ames's contention that ownership by the
loss of possession was turned into a mere right of action was ever
1 (1916) 29 HARV. L. Rzv. 745. "" 161 Mass. 472, 480 (1894).
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maintainable, is the less important because it certainly ceased to be so
centuries ago, and such a theory has left no impress on modem
law .... "87
Were all as clear on this as Professor Williston the foregoing need not
have been written.188
" Williston, Delivery as a Requisite in the Sale of Chattel Property (1922)
35 HARv. L. Rxv. 797.
"0 A penetrating comment on Disseisin of Chattels is that of Sir Frederick
Pollock in a letter to Professor Hazeltine. He said: "Thanks for the sight of
the Maitland-Ames letters. My own notion is that our medieval ancestors were
more like ourselves-meaning the English Bar of the nineteenth-twentieth cen-
turies-and cared less about having a logical theory of the forms of actions than
Ames, and for the most part his successors, appear tacitly to assume." 2 CAsB.
L. J. (1924) 3.
(To be continued in a subsequent issue)
